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1As a nation, we are now conscious of the
potential for nuclear, biological and chemi-
cal attacks on our own soil.  According to
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge,
U.S. intelligence services have significant
evidence indicating that terrorists already
possess chemical and biological weapons.
Documents discovered in Afghan caves,
videotapes of dogs being gassed at Al Qaeda
training camps, and the discovery of chemi-
cal-weapons protective gear and Ricin in
recent raids on terrorist cells in Europe con-
firms that terrorism involving chemical or
biological weapons is no longer a theory but
a threat that now confronts every American.
As Newsweek reported in February 2003, in
an internal intelligence report, a group of
CIA analysts predicted that there is only a 6
percent probability that another terrorist
attack within the U.S. will never occur.1
Traditional warfare planning requires
preparing troops with sufficient defense, res-
cue and medical capabilities.  The military
works hard to ensure that it has the technol-
ogy to detect and respond to an attack; the
personnel, equipment and facilities to treat
casualties; and the communications systems
necessary to coordinate responses.  
Clearly, the threat of a chemical, biological
or radiological attack within U.S borders
demands equally strong defenses. Yet, the
U.S. public health system, which is an inte-
gral part of America’s first line of defense, is
woefully unprepared to meet this challenge.
Thirty years of inadequate training, staffing,
equipment, and funding have left our pub-
lic health system in serious disrepair.2
Today, analysts believe that America’s public
health system lacks the capacity to:
 Rapidly detect a biological attack and
its victims; 
 Accurately identify the toxic substances
used in a chemical attack; 
 Rapidly treat and prevent further
spread; and
 Communicate the existence of an attack
and required actions to necessary
responders.
While recent federal bioterrorism funding
has begun to relieve the effect of years of
neglect, it has addressed only isolated issues
rather than systemic problems.  However, a
majority of the public health, anti-terrorism
measures have focused primarily, if not exclu-
sively, on bioterrorism preparedness.  In fact,
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
required that the $1 billion in appropriated
funds be used only for bioterrorism, and not
chemical terrorism, related activities.3
This is startling oversight given the fact that
many experts, as outlined in an April 2003
report by the General Accounting Office
(GAO), have warned that chemical weapons
are much more accessible and likely to be
used in the event of an attack.4
I.  Introduction
The United States is fighting the war against terrorism on many frontsboth at home and abroad.   With the horrific images of the September
11, 2001 attacks etched into our memories, Americans know that we must be
prepared to prevent and respond to a growing array of threats.
2Moreover, the public health system now
faces increased pressure due to dramatic
federal and state budgetary shortfalls and
the reemergence of infectious diseases such
as severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS).  As a result, the lives of countless
American families could be in jeopardy.
There is no question that America’s public
health system requires a systematic and com-
prehensive upgrading.  In a majority of com-
munities, the same resources public health
professionals once devoted only to protect-
ing families from infectious and chronic dis-
ease are now being called upon to protect
Americans from terrorism.  As policymakers
act on our nation’s commitment to combat
terrorism, they have a unique opportunity
to have homeland security dollars perform
“double duty” by expanding the public
health system’s capacity to protect commu-
nities from a full spectrum of modern
health threats, including those of terrorism.  
This opportunity was highlighted in a January
2003 report by the GAO, which concluded
that the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services “must find ways to coordinate
programs that dually address critical home-
land security priorities and basic public health
needs and ensure that the nation’s fragile pub-
lic health infrastructure is strengthened at the
federal, state, and local levels.”5
The purpose of this report is to address the
urgent need to upgrade an indispensable
component of the public health system and
one that is essential to homeland security:
public health laboratories.
Public health laboratories, together with hos-
pitals and local health departments, are quite
literally the “front lines” of America’s surveil-
lance of and response to biological, chemi-
cal, or radiological attacks.  Simultaneously,
these laboratories play a critical role in pro-
tecting Americans from a wide range of other
health threats, including longstanding neme-
ses (cancer, heart disease), emerging epi-
demics (West Nile Virus and severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS), food borne dis-
eases (e-coli and salmonella poisoning), and
accidents involving hazardous chemicals.  If
approached strategically, expanding the
capacity of public health laboratories could
respond to the acute needs of both America’s
war against terrorism and the continuing bat-
tle to protect America’s health. 
This report addresses:
A. The role of public health laboratories
and how, together with much of the
public health system, these vital facili-
ties have fallen into a state of disrepair;
B. A series of assessments on the ability of
state public health labs to respond to
specific chemical weapon events; and 
C. Recommendations for improving state
public health laboratories so that they
can respond effectively to terrorism as
well as more conventional threats —
from analyzing water contaminants to
cancer screening.
3Recently, public health laboratories have
gained increased public attention in light of
their crucial new role in responding to the
threat of chemical, biological or radiological
terrorist attacks.8 Given that laboratory pro-
fessionals are not only charged with helping to
identify harmful agents, but also with prevent-
ing their spread and facilitating rapid treat-
ment, their role is widely recognized as critical
if America is to respond effectively to both
existing and emergent health threats. In an
emergency, rapid identification of unknown
substances can mean the difference between
life and death as was evident in 2002 when 117
hostages in a Moscow theater died after an
unidentified incapacitating gas was pumped
into the theater’s ventilation system.9
Recent guidelines from the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) point
out that “clinical lab personnel will most like-
ly be the first ones to perform preliminary
testing on clinical specimens from patients
who may have been intentionally exposed [to
biological or chemical terrorism] ... and will
play a critical role in facilitating rapid identi-
fication of [the hazardous substance].”10
Though Americans rely upon the public
health laboratories for a wide range of impor-
tant functions, including disease manage-
ment, prevention and food safety,11 there is
no seamless, integrated system to ensure that
labs are prepared to meet these needs.  
A.  CDC Laboratories
CDC operates the world’s premier public health
laboratories. They are the focal point of federal
efforts to combat disease threats.  CDC’s labora-
tory remains the lead laboratory in our nation
with the capacity to conduct comprehensive
testing for the presence of toxic chemicals in the
human body.12 In a domestic emergency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigations laboratory at
Quantico, Virginia and the Department of
Defense facility in Aberdeen, Maryland could
potentially be called upon as well.
In addition to operating its laboratory, CDC
also provides leadership for public health
laboratories throughout the United States
and much of the world.  The agency provides
funding in grants and cooperative agree-
ments; develops and promotes best practices
guidelines and new test methodologies;
develops and maintains a Web-based infor-
mation system that links CDC, public health,
hospital, and independent laboratories and
provides disease surveillance; and is also
takes the lead in addressing identified gaps in
services.  Importantly, CDC also is largely
responsible for training state and local public
heath officials in the use of new equipment
and innovative laboratory techniques.
II. America’s Public
Health Laboratories
The term “public health laboratories” actually refers to a “loose network of fed-eral, state and local laboratories that work in undefined collaboration with
private clinical laboratories.”6 Today, there are approximately 174,000 laboratories
operating in the United States; approximately 2,000 of these are public health lab-
oratories, and the remainder are hospital, independent, and physician office labo-
ratories.7 Together, they are essential to safeguarding our nation’s public health.  
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Each of the 50 states (and the five U.S. terri-
tories) operates a state public health labora-
tory (SPHL).  Most SPHLs are responsible for
providing diagnostic and analytical services
for the assessment and surveillance of infec-
tious, communicable, genetic, and chronic
diseases. Some SPHLs routinely monitor envi-
ronmental health concerns, as well. 
However, state labs are hardly uniform in their
capabilities, functions, or resources.13 Each
state lab was created and operates independ-
ently with its state-defined charter.  As a result,
the capabilities, responsibilities, and practices
of the SPHLs  vary substantially in many areas
that directly impact America’s ability to
respond to chemical or biological attacks or
other public health emergencies, such as food
poisoning or toxic substance exposure:
 State health systems individually deter-
mine which diseases are tracked by labo-
ratories or clinicians within their states.14
 Generally, each SPHL operates under the
leadership of the state health officer;
however, the nature of the relationship
between the health officer and the labo-
ratory director varies by state.
 SPHLs differ widely in their staffing and
funding levels.
 Sources of SPHL funds vary significantly,
with some states relying upon user test
fees for a portion of funding.
 Centralization of laboratory functions
varies, with some states utilizing private or
regional facilities for certain tests.
 Some SPHLs conduct far broader opera-
tions and missions than others, with some
SPHLs limited to direct tests of patient
specimens, while others conduct activities
ranging from general research to envi-
ronmental monitoring.
C.  Municipal, County and Private
Laboratories
Operating under each state’s SPHLs are a
wide variety of municipal and county public
health agencies that offer laboratory services
as well as private laboratories, including those
in hospitals and academic centers, many of
which devote a portion of their resources to
supporting their respective SPHL.  It is within
this assortment of laboratories that the vast
majority of testing for public health occurs in
many states.  Accordingly, the level of com-
munication and coordination between these
laboratories and their SPHL is essential to
ensuring the availability, quality, and report-
ing of tests performed by these facilities.  
A WEAK LINK IN THE CURRENT
PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY
SYSTEM CHAIN
Many SPHLs rely heavily upon privately run labo-
ratories to supplement and complement their
ability to serve communities. 
Traditionally, the public-private partnerships have
provided an efficient means for the public labora-
tory system to access additional resources.  Yet
because private laboratories have their own sepa-
rate missions, they are unable to fulfill the entire
wide range of needs to the capacity required of
the public system.
Generally, private laboratories primarily are
focused on individual patient care and treatment.
As a result, their equipment, facilities, and work-
force are designed to manage a semi-predictable
patient load; it is not economical for laboratories
to retain the staff necessary to respond to a sig-
nificant public health emergency.  However, addi-
tional staffing is precisely what is required in the
event of a terrorist incident or major accident. 
As officials prepare their responses to the very
real threat of a terror-related public health
emergency, careful consideration must be given
to the current system’s reliance upon private
laboratories.
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ducted by the Association of Public Health
Laboratories (APHL) and the GAO. The
APHL study uncovered alarming shortcom-
ings in the ability of public health labs to
respond to a chemical terrorist attack.  On a
one-to-ten scale measuring preparedness for
a chemical incident (with ten being the most-
prepared), a November 2002 APHL survey
found that 34 of the state labs rate themselves
at a ‘four’ or below while 14 others rated
themselves as a ‘five’ or a ‘six.’  The survey
also determined that only eight laboratories
had any chemical terrorism response plan in
place.  This lack of preparation may be dan-
gerous, especially in light of a March 2003
GAO report that concluded:
Chemical facilities may be attractive targets for
terrorists intent on causing economic harm and
loss of life.  Many facilities exist in populated
areas where a chemical release could threaten
thousands.  EPA reports that 123 chemical facil-
ities located throughout the nation have toxic
‘worst case’ scenarios where more than a million
people in the surrounding area could be at risk
of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas if a release
occurred.  To date, no one has comprehensively
assessed the security of chemical facilities.15
Though terrorism experts once warned of
the use of chemical weapons such as Sarin gas
or the nerve agent VX, the difficulty of using
these weapons in a civilian environment has
led some to rethink their earlier assumptions.
According to Department of Health and
Human Services Acting Assistant Secretary
for Public Health Emergency Preparedness,
Jerry Hauer:  “Now the greater threats are
toxic industrial materials that travel the high-
ways every day.” 16
In light of these estimations, TFAH reviewed
what resources or policies are necessary to
improve the abilities of laboratories to
respond in the event of a chemical attack.
This also informs what can and should to be
done to revitalize the labs to manage the
broader spectrum of public health concerns.
A facility’s preparedness to respond to 
chemical terrorism helps illustrate its general
preparedness to respond to public health
emergencies as a whole.
Components of the two research efforts
included:  
1. Presenting five SPHL directors with a
hypothetical chemical weapon scenario to
determine (a) how each lab would respond,
and (b) if there were shortcomings in their
preparedness to respond in the case of such
an event; and 
2. Selecting three industrial chemicals,
which are widely recognized as potential
agents of chemical terrorism, to determine
how prevalent they are within the United
States, and how well prepared SPHLs might
be to respond in case of an attack using
these agents. 
III. TFAH Study of 
State Laboratories
Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) conducted a two-part study to examine the critical role of public health labs in the event of a 
terrorist chemical attack and to assess risks to the public if these laboratories
are not prepared.  
6A.  Hypothetical Chemical
Terrorist Attack Scenario:
Courtside Terror
The deficiencies in the nation’s public
health laboratory system are not theoretical
problems.  If left unaddressed they are like-
ly to cost American lives. 
The following description of a potential ter-
rorist event highlights America’s dependence
on public health laboratories.  The fact pat-
tern represents a variation on an event that
actually occurred, and it is a good approxima-
tion of the type of incident that terrorism ana-
lysts believe is likely.  In this case study, the role
of the public health laboratory system is exam-
ined, and the practical implications of proba-
ble deficiencies in the system when faced with
such an episode are described.  Other fact pat-
terns likely would highlight other deficiencies
in America’s public health laboratories.
1.  Terror at the FleetCenter
In this era of heightened concern, fans enter-
ing NBA arenas are subject to random
searches with detector wands while handbags
are checked and larger bags are banned.
Nevertheless, during the third quarter of the
Boston Celtics’ home game against the Los
Angeles Clippers on March 7, 2003, Celtics
players suddenly fled their bench, covering
their faces with their warm-up jackets and
towels.  Players and fans seated immediately
behind the bench gagged on noxious fumes.
Everyone’s thoughts turned to terrorism.
The game was delayed only nine minutes.
Luckily, no one required medical treatment.
Boston police and FleetCenter security ulti-
mately determined the incident was a prank
involving mace or pepper spray.  Investigators
tested the air in the arena before the next
night’s hockey game and tested for any residue
of the substance.  They found no harmful
material.  Nor did investigators find a canister. 
One can easily imagine a few twists in the
fact pattern.  
At a game at a major indoor arena three
months later, a crew of terrorists sitting behind
the home team’s bench spray a noxious chem-
ical.  Instead of momentary gagging, players
and fans in the immediate vicinity begin chok-
ing, having seizures and fainting.  Thousands
of fans throughout the building begin to suffer.
Emergency personnel rush to the scene, dis-
cover chaos, and are themselves exposed to
toxic fumes.  Unaware of the chemical used,
they must make immediate response decisions.
At this point, the survival of all those
exposed depends upon prompt, proper
identification of the hazardous substance.17
Patients must receive antidotes quickly.18
However, if the wrong antidote is adminis-
tered, lives could be lost.19
Under ideal circumstances, emergency per-
sonnel would immediately call in HAZMAT
units based upon the description of the phys-
ical state of the victims. Those units would, in
turn, be equipped with a combination of
detectors capable of generally characterizing
the chemical agent.  Yet, studies indicate that
many emergency response units are signifi-
cantly concerned that they lack these capabil-
ities.20 Existing technology and devices used
in the field are varied, and there is a lack of
uniformity in training for the use of the
devices.  Moreover, testing of residue of the
chemical on environmental samples, such as
air, soil, or clothing, is often problematic; in
the case of a gas attack, for example, the
agent used easily could be dispersed.  
As a result, initial identification and diagnosis
is likely to rest with the public health labora-
tories.  In any event, whether for confirma-
tion, initial identification, or long-term treat-
ment strategies, laboratory analysis of the
chemical elements is crucial.  
2.  Survey Results from SPHLs:
Laboratories Ill-Prepared to Respond,
a “Train-Wreck in Front of Our Eyes”
Five state public health laboratory directors
who currently serve on the APHL board of
directors were surveyed about their ability to
respond to the scenario described above (See
Appendix A).  The results of this study are star-
tling: despite the fact that homeland security
officials warn that such an event is likely, our
laboratories are largely unable to provide the
7swift, certain analysis necessary to save lives.
According to one of the respondents, “should
an event such as the scenario above occur
today, proper identification of the agent, which
drives treatment, containment, and clean-up
decisions, will be haphazard and lengthy.”
3.  Lack of Clear Direction and Coordination
According to the SPHL directors surveyed,
they have received no clear direction from
any federal agency or other authority defin-
ing the role and function of any front-line
local and state responding agency in the
event of a chemical terrorist attack.  As one
step to try to address this issue, the CDC is
currently providing funds to a five states to
begin building the capacity to identify chemi-
cal agents.  Additionally, there has been virtu-
ally no assessment of capabilities, and essen-
tially no coordination of possible responders
and resources, such as HAZMAT units, public
health laboratories, EPA laboratories, and
Department of Defense laboratories.  
Absent careful coordination, planning, or
jurisdictional guidelines, state public health
laboratories can develop response plans based
only on incomplete information and without a
clear sense of their role within the context of
the larger emergency response. As a result,
they are at serious risk of making quick, but
wrong decisions based on limited information
or assumptions in the case of an attack.  
4.  First Response:  Basing Action on
Assumptions
The survey respondents anticipated a reliance
on the HAZMAT units as “first responders” to
initially manage such a chemical attack.  They
based their predictions about what would hap-
pen on “best guess” assumptions of how emer-
gency responders would handle specific chem-
ical threats.  However, there was no clear direc-
tion about how HAZMAT units or other first
responders would “hand-off” information or
samples to the labs. For instance, one director
responded that he assumed that:
“The HAZMAT unit would make a judgment
as to the probable cause and might use some
sort of rapid test for tentative verification.
They might also collect wipe samples and air
samples.  They would want to send samples to
the public health labs as they do now with sus-
pected bioterrorism samples.  However, our
chemical capabilities are questionable.”
Another responded that:
“The scenario is a likely one and has been played
out with biological agents many times.  It might
be difficult to bring in enough of a chemical
agent to overwhelm the entire FleetCenter, but just
a couple of isolated areas affected at the same time
would cause panic and rioting.  HAZMATs and
police would be the likely first responders.  They
may or may not be able to identify the class of
compounds, but a good HAZMAT team can col-
lect air samples for laboratory analyses.”
One laboratory director from a state that has
only a limited emergency chemical 
terrorism response plan suggested that prior to
a sample “take-in” at the SPHL, all samples
would be first triaged (field tested) for radia-
tion, incendiaries, and hazardous chemicals by
the FBI or another law enforcement agency.
5.  Sample Testing:  Diagnosis Critical
The director of one lab explained that, in the
case of a chemical attack, “identifying the
group of chemicals and knowing the most
prevalent symptoms will direct treatment and
control decisions.”  There are two types of
tests that can help make this identification:  
a.  Testing “environmental” samples, including
air, water, soil, food, or clothing.  Various 
agencies, including state public health labora-
tories, EPA laboratories, or Department of
Defense laboratories have various abilities to
test these samples depending on their equip-
ment, expertise, and facilities. 
b. Testing “clinical” samples taken from
humans, such as blood or urine.  Public health
laboratories are the only group that has this
potential capability.   Here again, capabilities
vary widely depending on the nature of the
chemical attack and the equipment, expertise,
and facilities of a given lab.  However, the CDC
does have the ability to test clinical specimens
for a number of chemical terrorism agents.  
8i.  Environmental Sample Testing Capabilities
The state public health laboratories typical-
ly have limited ability to test chemical envi-
ronmental samples.  Their capabilities are
driven largely by the ability to respond to
acknowledged ongoing environmental
health risks, such as mercury, lead, and poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).  For exam-
ple, according to the TFAH survey, four out
of five of the lab directors indicated they
have the ability to test environmental sam-
ples for many metals (including arsenic,
mercury, and lead).  Three out of five have
the ability to test for certain choking agents.  
The laboratories generally lack the ability to
test a much wider range of available potential-
ly harmful chemicals: those most likely to be
used in a terrorist assault.  None of the lab
directors indicated that they have the ability to
conduct environmental tests for nerve agents
(including VX and Sarin), blister agents
(including mustard gas), and incapacitating
agents (including phenothiazines or anesthet-
ics such as those used in the Moscow theater
incident).21 Two out of five SPHLs surveyed
reported the ability to test for biotoxins
(including ricin), and two out of five have the
ability to test for caustics (including acids).
Only one in five of the labs has the ability to test
for riot control tear agents and blood agents
(including arsine).  One SPHL may have a lim-
ited ability to test for vomiting agents.   
If public health labs do not have the necessary
environmental testing capabilities, they send
samples to CDC.  However, while CDC has the
capacity to test clinical specimens for chemical
terrorism agents, the agency relies upon EPA to
test environmental samples, although EPA has
not been given a legal mandate to do so.  One
of the respondents called this “a glaring prob-
lem.”  Emergency responders or the public
health labs may instead hope to use alternative
labs such as the facilities under the jurisdiction
of EPA or Department of Defense, which may
have varying abilities to conduct environmental
testing.  However, the lack of readily available
information as to whether an agency has the
capability to test various substances severely
impairs the ability of emergency responders to
obtain an accurate analysis.
ii.  Clinical or Human Sample Testing
Capabilities
The capabilities of state public health labora-
tories to test human or clinical samples for
chemical agents are minimal at best.  Most
state labs lack the specialized “biomonitoring”
equipment and staff to perform this type of
testing.  In most cases, the laboratories would
need to send samples to the CDC for testing.  
Table I:  Laboratory Capacity to Test for Potential Chemical Agents:  Summary of Five State
Laboratory Directors’ Responses
Chemical Agents Lab Capability To Test Lab Capability to 
Environmental Sample Clinical Sample Send Sample to CDC
Biotoxins (e.g. ricin) 2 of 5 2 of 5 5 of 5
Blister Agents/ Vesicants 0 of 5 0 of 5 4 of 5 and 1 possible
(e.g. mustard gas)
Blood Agents (e.g. arsine) 1 of 5 1 of 5 4 of 5 and 1 possible
Caustics (acids) 2 of 5 1 of 5 4 of 5 and1 possible
Choking/ Lung/ Pulmonary Agents 3 of 5 1 of 5 4 of 5
(e.g. chlorine and cyanide)
Incapacitating (e.g. phenothiazines) 0 of 5 0 of 5 4 of 5
Metals (e.g. arsenic and mercury) 4 of 5 1 of 5 and1 possible 5 of 5
and1 limited
Nerve Agents   (e.g. VX, Sarin) 0 of 5 0 of 5 4 of 5
Riot Control/ Tear Agents 1 of 5 0 of 5 4 of 5
Vomiting  (e.g. DM, DA, DC) 1 possible 0 of 5 4 of 5
* Based on survey conducted April 2003.  Environmental samples = air, soil, or water. 
Clinical samples = blood, urine, or saliva.
9According to the TFAH survey, two SPHLs
indicated the ability to test clinical samples for
biotoxins (including ricin), and only one lab
could test for blood agents (including arsine),
caustics (including acid), choking or lung
agents (including chlorine and cyanide).
One lab indicated limited ability to test for
lead.  None of the SPHLs could test clinical
samples for blister agents (including mustard
gas), incapacitating agents, nerve agents, riot
control tear agents, or vomiting agents.
Additionally, in many states the public health
laboratories are focused primarily upon popu-
lation-based services (i.e. disease surveillance,
health education and community health plan-
ning), not personal services.22 As a result, the
laboratories are not oriented to examining
individuals and conducting clinical testing.  
Although four of the directors noted that they
had the capability to send chemical samples to
CDC in the case of an attack and the CDC
reports that a protocols exists for collecting and
sending samples for chemical analysis through
the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), the
February 2003 APHL survey of state laboratory
personnel indicated that they did not have pro-
tocols for laboratory evaluation of specific
chemical threats or even for sending chemical
samples.  Unlike for incidents of bioterrorism,
public health laboratories are not organized in
a coordinated network to optimize workflow in
the case of a chemical incident.  The outcome
is that obtaining and transmitting appropriate
samples for analysis by the federal laboratory
could prove to be much more difficult than
anticipated.  
6. Missing Plans, Protocols, and Surge
Capacity
Three of the five directors surveyed said that
they did not have a chemical terrorism
response plan in place and/or protocols for
laboratory evaluation of specific chemical
threats and/or for shipping chemical samples.
Two responded that they had limited plans in
place or had plans developed for industrial
spills or radiochemical events, which could
potentially be adapted and applied in the case
of a chemical terror attack.  
The five directors also described a lack of
both appropriate standards and analytic
methods for examining samples and per-
formance testing programs for these agents. 
Additionally, the SPHL directors also expressed
concern at their lack of capacity to respond
should their lab be inundated with a high num-
ber of samples.  Each director pointed out that
time required to make a positive identification
for clinical samples was “days, if at all.”
Shipping samples to another facility, such as
CDC or a Department of Defense facility would
only add to the time lag. As one director point-
ed out,  “Given the emergency nature of the
event, I would anticipate expedited processing
and results in 2 to 3 days (if we are lucky).”  
If the chemical exposure was more wide-
spread and resulted in the need to conduct
testing of individuals on a regional basis, the
public health lab system would be quickly
overwhelmed due to inadequate staffing.
Moreover, coordination with partner labora-
tories would very likely suffer due to commu-
nications deficiencies, since there is a lack of
a coordinated communications system
between labs to manage chemical threats. 
7.  Risks to Labs’ Workforce, Facility Failures
The SPHL directors also voiced concerns about
risks to the safety of laboratory personnel and
lack of guidance on safe storage and security of
chemical agents.  APHL’s February 2002 study
found that there are no comprehensive guide-
lines available for laboratory workers when han-
dling agents of chemical terrorism.  In that
study, half of the state laboratories indicated
that worker protection equipment is “not very
adequate” for chemical toxins, and 75 percent
indicated that they could not safely handle sam-
ples containing multiple hazards, such as bio-
logical and chemical agents.  
If laboratory workers are improperly trained
or unprepared to handle a certain chemical,
they risk exposure themselves, compound-
ing the effects of the attack.23 Improper
handling also could cause a laboratory to
become contaminated, shutting it down
completely and causing the public to lose
the critical services provided by the labora-
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tory for an extended period of time while
decontamination takes place.24
Emergency workers could also be at-risk
under a number of other possible scenarios.
For example, if a biological pathogen was
placed into the ventilation system following
a chemical attack, emergency workers could
rapidly spread exposure to the agent in the
rush to evacuate the victims of the chemical
attack and transport them for treatment.  
In addition to its shortcomings in identifying
chemicals where exposure is certain to have
occurred, the public health laboratory system
is largely unprepared to determine whether
other individuals with less direct contact with
the chemical substance may have been
exposed.  In this regard, the directors recom-
mend that chemical terrorism practice exer-
cises would be highly useful to inform and
improve their preparedness capabilities.
8.  The Bad News:  It Could Be Much Worse
If the hypothetical scenario had been applied
to other states, the results would have been no
better and likely could well have been much
worse.  In most cases, the SPHL director
would be required to send a chemical sample
to a federal facility and would then need to
wait a minimum of 24 hours for results.  The
time lost would severely impair the ability to
treat victims and could cost lives.25
As one director remarked, “there are defi-
nite problems - safety of laboratory person-
nel, lack of appropriate standards and ana-
lytic methods, lack of proficiency testing
programs for these agents, lack of guidance
on safe storage and security of agents
and/or metabolites.” Or, as APHL’s
Executive Director Scott Becker wrote in a
message to public health lab administrators,
“we see what I call a ‘train wreck,’ and it’s
happening right in front of our eyes.”26
B. Assessment of Chemicals in States
and Labs’ Abilities to Respond:
Present Risk, Absent Ability
CDC has identified over 60 toxic substances
that could be used as chemical weapons by
terrorists. To illustrate the widespread use
and availability of these chemicals, TFAH
selected three examples that are commonly
used in American industry: phosgene,
arsine, and cyanide-based compounds. Each
of these substances is a potential weapon in
the hands of terrorists.27 Not only are these
three chemicals routinely used for industri-
al purposes, they are readily available as
gases.  This means that they are particularly
difficult for a response team to detect.
Further, these gases are extraordinarily
toxic and could have delayed impacts on vic-
tims if not readily detected. 
In its second study of public health prepared-
ness, TFAH assessed the following data:
1.General geographic locations where these
three chemicals are found in the United
States28; and
2. The ability of SPHLs to identify human expo-
sure to such chemicals within their facilities.
WHAT IS BIOMONITORING?  
PERFORMING DOUBLE DUTY:  Chemical
Agent Identification and Human 
Exposure Assessment 
Biomonitoring is the testing of human samples,
such as blood or urine, for chemicals in their
metabolites. This capability is key to the core
functions of an effective public health laboratory.
Without biomonitoring, the diagnosis and treat-
ment of chemical exposures can be delayed.
Biomonitoring also is an important tool in dis-
ease prevention. When combined with disease
tracking efforts, biomonitoring enables public
health professionals to better understand what,
where and when exposures occur, as well as
their potential links to environmental factors. 
Currently, only CDC has the ability to analyze
the impact of a broad spectrum of chemicals in
clinical samples.  As the TFAH study revealed,
many state laboratories lack the capacity to
test blood or urine for even very common chem-
icals.  This has caused delays, for example, in
determining the exposures experienced by the
firefighters and other front-line responders dur-
ing the September 11, 2001 attack on the
World Trade Centers in New York (the results of
which have yet to be publicly released).  
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TFAH conducted a series of interviews with
federal and state lab directors and personnel
to assess which states have the capabilities to
test for various chemical exposures.  
As discussed in the preceding section, rapid
identification is critical to emergency
response-both treatment of victims and con-
tainment of exposure.  TFAH found that while
vast amounts of these chemicals are in use,
SPHLs are extremely limited in their ability to
identify them. However, these chemicals are as
hazardous as they are common. Specifically:
a. Arsine is a blood agent.  In its pure form,
it is a colorless, flammable, highly toxic gas
with a garlic or fish-like odor. Inhalation is
the most common route of exposure. 
The first sign of symptoms after exposure are
usually nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain.
Other symptoms may include: headache,
malaise, thirst, shivering, dizziness, hypoten-
sion, muscle pain and twitches, kidney failure,
and dyspnea. These symptoms, along with
acute cardiac abnormalities, under heavy
exposure can become evident within 30 to 60
minutes and can be fatal. In the case of mini-
mal exposure, less serious symptoms can
occur 2 to 24 hours later.  Long-term effects,
such as peripheral nerve damage may become
evident one to two weeks after contact with the
agent. Chronic exposure can result in gas-
trointestinal upset, anemia, and damage to
lungs, kidneys, liver, nervous system, heart and
other blood-forming organs.29
Arsine is commonly used in the semicon-
ductor industry and in the manufacture of
crystals for fiber optics and computer chips.
Arsine in 23 States and 1 U.S. Territory
Arsine is believed to be used in at least 23
states and one U.S. territory, including
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and
Virginia. (See Appendix B) 
No U.S. Public Health Laboratories Can
Test for Arsine
The CDC and state public health laborato-
ries indicate that they do not currently have
the capability to test for arsine in human
clinical (blood, urine, or saliva) samples.
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b. Cyanide-based compounds:  Cyanide is
usually joined with other chemicals to form
compounds such as hydrogen cyanide, sodi-
um cyanide and potassium cyanide.30
Exposure to cyanide can be very toxic. At
high levels, cyanide harms the brain and
heart and can cause coma or death. At lower
levels, breathing difficulty, heart pains, vom-
iting, blood changes, headaches, and
enlarged thyroid can occur. If ingested,
cyanide can cause deep breathing or short-
ness of breath, convulsions, loss of con-
sciousness and possibly death. Skin contact
can produce irritation and sores. Chronic
exposure results primarily in cardiovascular
and respiratory effects and possible irrita-
tion to skin and eyes.31
Cyanide usually is used in conjunction with
hydrogen in certain industries, such as 
electroplating, metallurgy, production of
chemicals, photographic development, plas-
tics making, ship fumigating, wastewater
treatment facilities and in some mining
processes. 
Cyanide-Based Compounds in 41 States
and 1 U.S. Territory
Cyanide-based compounds are found in 41
states and one U.S. territory, including
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto
Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
(See Appendix B) 
The CDC and At Least One State Can
Currently Test for Cyanide-Based
Compounds, More Expected by Next Year
The CDC and the Iowa state public health
laboratory have the ability to test for
cyanide-based compounds in clinical sam-
ples.  The five SPHLs that have received
funding from the CDC to support surge test-
ing of blood, urine, and saliva samples for
specific compounds — California,
Michigan, New York, New Mexico, and
Virginia — are expected to be able to test
for cyanide-based compounds next year.
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c.  Phosgene is a choking agent that can dam-
age the respiratory tract, causing extensive
fluid build-up in the lungs. In addition, it can
cause severe irritation, frostbite and chemical
burns when in contact with skin or eyes.  It is
used commercially in organic synthesis, pesti-
cides and herbicides, pharmaceuticals, dye
manufacturing, as a chemical intermediary,
and in the welding of metals.32
Exposure to phosgene, either by inhalation
or direct contact with skin or eyes, has no
antidote once exposed. Impact on the body
and symptoms can be delayed up to 24
hours after exposure. Common symptoms
include: shortness of breath or difficulty
breathing, irritation of mucous membranes,
coughing, tightness of chest, eye, throat and
skin irritation, and chemical burns. The
severity of these symptoms will vary depend-
ing on the amount and type of exposure.
Acute phosgene poisoning may affect the
brain, heart and blood due to lack of oxy-
gen from improperly functioning lungs.
Symptoms can be treated by moving to fresh
air, rest, oxygen therapy, clearing fluid from
lungs, washing thoroughly any exposed
areas, and washing or rinsing skin or eyes
with soap and warm water.33
Phosgene in 11 States
Phosgene is reported in 11 states, including
Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.  (See
Appendix B) 
No U.S. Public Health Laboratories Can
Test Phosgene
Currently, the CDC laboratories and state
laboratories do not have the capability to
test for phosgene in human clinical (e.g.
blood, urine, saliva) samples.
This investigation makes evident that chem-
icals that could potentially be used in a ter-
rorist attack are also in wide use by U.S.
industry.  Yet, despite their prevalence, our
public health laboratory system lacks the
capacity to respond rapidly to emergencies
involving these agents.  Public health labs
also have a limited ability to respond to
cases of accidental exposure involving these
and other similar chemicals when their
identity is not known.
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C.  Suffering from Neglect and an
Urgent Need for Renewal
There is no question that America’s public
health system “must become an indispensa-
ble pillar of our national security framework”
or that public health “is a national security
issue.”34 There is also broad agreement that
the system is not prepared for this role due to
years of neglect.35 On top of that, traditional-
ly, public health laboratories were not
designed to have the capacity to respond to
the threats of biological, chemical, and
nuclear terrorist acts in local communities,
which have become a tangible possibility.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001
attacks, Congress moved quickly to pass the
“Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.”
The legislation earmarked a record $3 bil-
lion for anti-bioterrorism activities.
Included in that appropriation was more
than $1 billion to upgrade state and local
public health capabilities and hospital pre-
paredness.36 Congress also authorized fund-
ing to upgrade the ability of health profes-
sionals to recognize and treat diseases
caused by bioterrorism and to speed the
development of new vaccines, and allocated
$147 million in new funds to improving lab-
oratory capacity. Included in this provision
was authorization to support the Laboratory
Response Network (LRN) to coordinate
communications between local, state and
federal laboratories.  
However, despite these efforts the funda-
mental problem of preparedness remains
largely unaddressed.  As U.S. Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), the lead sponsor
of the bioterrorism bill, recently acknowl-
edged, the new law is not nearly enough: 
Over the past two decades, the [nation’s public
health infrastructure] has greatly deteriorated.
A lack of focus, funding, and national atten-
tion have combined to reduce the physical
structures (such as laboratories) and workforce
capabilities necessary to collect and analyze
data, conduct epidemiology and disease sur-
veillance, communicate effectively, and imple-
ment interventions to respond to threats to the
health of our entire country.37
Dr. Julie Gerberding, the CDC’s director,
agrees, and adds that despite recent infu-
sions of federal funds, “public health is the
first service to experience declines... when
there are difficult budget times at the state,
(county and municipal) level.”38
SPHLs have been particularly hard hit.
According to a hallmark 1988 report issued
by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), by 1984,
only an average of three percent of state
health expenditures are directed to fund
laboratory services.39 Since then, little has
changed, according to the IOM’s 2002
report The Future of the Public’s Health in the
21st Century.40 As outlined below, serious
deficiencies are now readily apparent in the
three key components that define an effec-
tive SPHL:  (1) an adequate number of qual-
ified staff; (2) proficient, secure facilities
and equipment; and (3) a strong, integrated
communications system.41
1.  Inadequate Training and Staffing
SPHLs lack sufficient training opportunities
and adequate staff. For example, 18 percent
of jobs in the nation’s public health labs are
currently unfilled, and the salaries they
offer suggest there is little hope of filling
them.42 In addition:
• Over 75 percent of SPHLs report a short-
age of PhD-level molecular scientists cur-
rently on staff, and half had no PhD-level
experts in the SPHL.  Only nine SPHLs
had more than one.43
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• Many have insufficient staff to perform
basic testing for bioterrorism.44
• Half of SPHLs have no full-time information
technology staff to develop and maintain lab
information systems, and two-thirds report
shortages in administrative staff to handle
times of significant demand for services.45
Today, SPHLs are not adequately designed
or prepared to meet the range of responsi-
bilities they are asked to perform, even in
times of normal demand.  As one GAO
report released just after the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks starkly concluded:
“reductions in public health laboratory
staffing and training have affected the abili-
ty of state and local authorities to identify
biological agents.”46 A later GAO Report
issued in January 2003 added that: “increas-
ing staffing of public health departments
and laboratories is a top priority for enhanc-
ing preparedness in many areas.  Officials
told [GAO] that they did not have enough
trained epidemiologists, laboratory techni-
cians, and other professionals to respond to
the anthrax incidents while meeting normal
day-to-day responsibilities, such as prevent-
ing the transmission of sexually transmitted
diseases.”47
The administrators of SPHLs agree with the
GAO’s findings; in one survey, almost two-
thirds of SPHLs officials indicated that staff
vacancies had negatively affected the ability
to perform capably, and more than a quar-
ter reported that it had “greatly or signifi-
cantly” impacted their ability to perform in
a competent fashion.48 As a result of under-
staffing, two-thirds of SPHLs reported that
they lacked the ability to respond to surge in
service demands that accompanied the
anthrax events of October 2001.49
2.  Obsolete Facilities and Equipment
Prior to September 11, 2001, the physical
plant and equipment of public health labs
were almost uniformly sub-standard.
Targeted funding has improved or will
improve many capabilities; however, as the
recent APHL survey revealed, there remains
a great need for basic upgrades and mod-
ernization within facilities and additional
equipment to permit testing:
• Almost every SPHL has serious, basic phys-
ical plant defects.50
• Regional and local labs are among the
worst; even major metropolitan areas such
as Los Angeles must make do with 1960s-
era labs.51
• According to the APHL study, a large per-
centage of SPHLs need an upgrade to one
or more of the following physical struc-
tures:  storage facilities, freezers, biohaz-
ard disposal facilities, dedicated power sys-
tems, redundant fan systems, and air han-
dling systems.
• Close to 100 percent reported a need to
upgrade the basic mail and specimen-
receiving areas.52
Although some post-September 11, 2001
improvements have been made, SPHLs still
lack the equipment, technology, and
processes to test for many elements likely to
be used in terrorist attacks.  For example,
although CDC has developed a rapid toxic
screen to test for 150 chemical weapons
agents, only five states have been provided
with testing capability.
Additionally, according to the APHL survey,
laboratory professionals are not trained to
handle potential chemical terrorism agents
and facilities lack sufficient protective
equipment. The survey also found that
nearly three-quarters of the laboratories
reported inadequate air handling systems,
threatening lab workers and other building
tenants with exposure to toxic elements and
the labs to contamination. 
Given the other shortcomings described, it’s
not surprising that the APHL survey also
found that three-quarters of SPHLs report-
ed a need for security upgrades, including
locks, electronic tracking of entries and
video surveillance.  
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3.  Antiquated Communications
Public health labs lack communication sys-
tems capable of facilitating rapid response to
emergencies. The APHL survey found that
less than half of responding laboratories had
rapid communications capabilities, including
blast-fax or even e-mail.  Approximately half
the survey respondents indicated that they
did not have full time Information
Technology staff dedicated to developing
and maintaining the lab information systems.
Additionally, a quarter of the state public
health labs stated that they did not have inte-
grated data management systems, and ten of
those that did have them reported that these
systems were over seven years old.  In the
event of an emergency, these limited or out-
dated communications systems severely
impairs the ability of the labs to share vital
information in a real-time manner.
The shortcomings of the communications
capabilities within the larger public health
community further diminishes the abilities
of the labs to perform in a rapid response
mode.  A recent Institute of Medicine report
revealed that during the anthrax events in
2001, “only half of the nation’s [public]
health departments had full-time Internet
connectivity.”  In fact, as many as 20 percent
of state, local and territorial health agencies
lacked e-mail and were unable to receive
any electronic updates regarding the
anthrax events.”53
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There has been a flurry of activity to address
this risk.  A billion dollars a year in federal
funding over the past two years has addressed
some specific problems: the stockpiling of var-
ious vaccines and other medicines, training
for certain events, and providing SPHLs with
the means to test for certain antibodies.  Some
individual laboratories have been earmarked
for upgrades or replacement, and some com-
munications systems have been improved.  
However, it would be a serious mistake to
believe that these efforts have done more
than patch a few leaky holes in the public
health care system.  Moreover, even with new
federal expenditures, overall public health
funding is declining due in part to massive
budget deficits at every level of government. 
To play an effective role in America’s war on
terrorism, our public health system needs
more money, better communications, addi-
tional personnel, improved training, modern-
ized facilities, and the direction and coordi-
nation only national leadership can provide.  
In addition to helping protect Americans
from the effect of biological and chemical
attacks, investing in public health yields an
added bonus: it will help our nation prevent
and respond to chronic and infectious dis-
eases, more effectively detect and treat food-
borne diseases, monitor and prevent envi-
ronmentally caused diseases, and meet
other public health challenges, which now
claim the lives of millions of Americans per
year.  An effective public health defense may
be the antidote to escalating health care
costs by more efficiently reducing and pre-
venting illness.  Now is the time to ensure
our homeland security investment is strate-
gic and creates a defense that protects us
from all health threats.
IV. Conclusion 
With biological or chemical terrorism within our borders consideredalmost inevitable, public health professionals have joined the mem-
bers of our armed services on the front lines of national security.  However,
America’s public health system is not up to the job.  As former Senate Armed
Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn recently stated, an attack on our pub-
lic health is the threat “we are least prepared to handle today.”54 TFAH’s study
of chemical capabilities at the state public health labs supports this statement.  
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As a first step, by 2004, CDC, in collaboration
with the Association of Public Health
Laboratories, must develop minimum require-
ments and standards for state laboratories to
ensure basic protections for all citizens.  These
should include the following:
• Improved Facilities: By the end of 2004,
every state should have at minimum test-
ing capabilities for priority biological and
chemical agents.
• Improved Communications: To ensure
effective coordination and rapidly identify
suspect infections, all state public health
laboratories must establish an effective
communications network incorporating
clinical laboratories, hospitals and private
labs that evaluate patients directly.
• Bolstered Workforce:  Each state labora-
tory should have PhD-level microbiolo-
gists and PhD-level chemists to ensure
effective biological, chemical and environ-
mental testing capacity.   
• Bolstered and Stable Funding:  To be pre-
pared for future emergencies, and ensure
basic standards laboratories must have a
strong and reliable funding base. States
must provide a minimum 40 percent of lab-
oratory budgets to ensure proper capacity.
Preparedness Needed for Chemical
Terrorism  
States have been able to quickly advance
bioterrorism preparedness because of devel-
opment efforts in the 1990s.  A similar fed-
eral commitment is needed now to develop
the nation’s response strategy for a potential
chemical weapon and/or radiological
attack.  This requires:
• National Coverage. For three years, begin-
ning in FY 2004, the federal budget must
include $200 million to enhance federal and
state public health laboratories capabilities,
including upgrading facilities and equip-
ment and bolstering the workforce. This
funding is essential if they are to have the
ability to conduct clinical testing for poten-
tial dangerous chemicals, such as ricin,
cyanide, nerve agents and pesticide expo-
sures.  After this period, laboratories should
be sustained at a level of approximately $100
million per year for rebuilding.  
V. Recommendations:  
FORTIFY AND ENSURE LABORATORY
CAPABILITIES IN ALL STATES
To restore their effectiveness, all state public health laboratories musthave minimum capacities to respond, 24 hours a day/7 days a week, to
the full spectrum of public health emergencies, including terrorism, without
compromising critical and routine investigations, such as testing drinking
water or food supplies. A federal agency such as the Department of
Homeland Security must step into the leadership void to ensure that the dif-
ferent local, state, and federal groups that may be called upon during a ter-
rorist attack are coordinated and cooperative in their activities.  
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• CDC Sets Mandatory Standards and
Training.  CDC must have the authority to
ensure capacity, collaboration and consis-
tent methodology for clinical testing for
chemical exposures.  The National Center
for Environmental Health should be sup-
ported to advance methodologies, devel-
op training systems and establish per-
formance measures for state laboratories.
The Department of Homeland Security
must partner with CDC and EPA to prior-
itize chemical agents for environmental
and clinical laboratory methodologies.  
• Conduct Chemical Exercises.  Key feder-
al agencies including DHS, EPA and CDC
must collaborate to develop a joint train-
ing exercise with states and first respon-
ders to prepare for chemical attacks.  The
scenario should be similar to the hypo-
thetical stadium attack outlined in this
report, where individuals were exposed to
unknown gaseous substances.   
• Ensure Double Duty.  To maximize their
value, biomonitoring measures should be
fully integrated into the nationwide health
tracking network to strengthen public
health investigations of chronic disease
and environmental risks.  For example,
federal preparedness investment should
allow laboratory equipment and training
to be used for routine human testing for
potential environmental contaminants.
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Appendix A:  
Survey Distributed to Five State Public Health Laboratory Directors: 
3. What is the likely timeframe for making a
positive identification for clinical sam-
ples?  And for environmental samples?
4. Do you have a chemical terrorism
response plan in place and/or protocols
for laboratory evaluation of specific chem-
ical threats and/or for shipping of chemi-
cal samples?  Do you foresee problems?
5. Would your workers have safety problems
in handling chemical samples or biologi-
cal samples containing a chemical agent?
6. In the event that a combination of bio-
logical, chemical or radiological agents
are included in the same attack, would
you be able to make proper identification
of samples?  Would you be able to handle
samples safely? 
7. If you were provided hundreds of samples
at once, what is your surge capacity?  How
would timing be affected?
1. What is the procedure your state follows
for identifying a chemical substance in
the above situation?
2. Does your SPHL have the capability to do
the identification itself (for all or most
chemicals, including nerve agents, inca-
pacitating agents, vesicants, blood agents,
certain industrial chemicals, and choking
agents), or must it send a sample to a fed-
eral or state lab?  Please respond by mark-
ing the table below:
LABORATORY CAPACITY TO TEST FOR POTENTIAL CHEMICAL AGENTS:  
Chemical Agents Lab Capability To Test Lab Capability to 
Environmental Sample Clinical Sample Send Sample to CDC
Biotoxins (e.g. ricin)
Blister Agents/ Vesicants
(e.g. mustard gas)
Blood Agents (e.g. arsine)
Caustics (acids)
Choking/ Lung/ Pulmonary Agents 
(e.g. chlorine and cyanide)
Incapacitating (e.g. phenothiazines)
Metals (e.g. arsenic and mercury)
Nerve Agents (e.g. VX, Sarin)
Riot Control/Tear Agents
Vomiting  (e.g. DM, DA, DC)
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STATES
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Washington, DC
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Phosgene
Present Capability 
in State to Test
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arsine
Present Capability 
in State to Test
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cyanide Based Compounds
Present Capability 
in State to Test
 
 
 
 
 *
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *
 *
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B:  
States with Supplies of Potential Chemical Weapons and Public Health
Laboratories Capability to test Clinical Samples for Exposure
*Ability to test for these chemicals anticipated in one year
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